of this case to some arguments against compositionality which were given in the context of complex sentences with unless.
There are many reasons to do this. First, EXCL phrases are formed syntactically from very specific syntactic elements, namely nominal determiners, and consequently their denotations are also specific since they are higher order objects. Since in general the principle of compositionality has been discussed in connection with major categories such as sentences, noun phrases or verb phrases, the discussion of the principle in relation to "minor" categories may be enlightening. This is even more obvious if it appears that some results obtained in connection with one category are easily generalisable to other categories: I show that the connective except occurring in EXCL phrases is in fact categorially polyvalent. Consequently any discussion of the validity of the principle of compositionality at sentential level appears directly relevant for other levels. At the background of this paper are two discussions of the semantics of natural languages, one in Higginbotham 1986 evoking semantic compositionality and the other, a reply to it, in Pelletier (1994b) . In order to show that natural languages cannot be compositional in general, Higginbotham considers sentences with the connective unless like those in (1):
(la) John will eat steak unless he eats lobster (lb) Every person will eat steak unless he eats lobster (lc) No person will eat steak unless he eats lobster Higginbotham notices that unless in (la) and (1b) corresponds to the (exclusive) disjunction whereas in (lc) it corresponds to the connective "and not". Thus, unless "means" different things in different contexts. From this observation Higginbotham draws the conclusion that a semantic principle which he calls the Principle of Indifference and which is related to the principle of compositionality, is false, and consequently that the facts like those in (1) show that the principle of compositionality is false for natural languages.
Pelletier (1994b) discusses Higginbotham's argument and proposes two solutions to the problem it raises. According to the first solution, unless is "vague", and its meaning is neither the disjunction nor the connective "and not" but rather some connective or other from a given set of possible connectives. The second solution makes unless "ambiguous" in the sense that this connective could be replaced by two different words corresponding to different "meanings" one finds in (la) and (1b) on the one hand and in (1c) on the other hand. Since the notion of ambiguity seems to play an important role in this argument, I will first make some related comments.
It is well-known that Boolean connectives in specific contexts tend to have different meanings than the one they have in isolation. There may be various reasons for this. One of them is the scopal influence of other operators present in the context. Consider for instance (2a) which is naturally interpreted by (2b) and not by (2c): Now the fact that the connective or in (2a) is interpreted by and (in conjunction with no) in no way indicates that or is ambigous or vague or that expressions containing it do not have a compositional semantics. This is just a manifestation of the well-known fact that many Boolean connectives are logically dependent and some of them can be used to define others. As for the logical status of (2a) Keenan and Moss (1985) provide a simple semantics for expressions of this type. Another case, which leads to a similar "ambiguity" of logical connectives is a phenomenon which may be called local equivalence, i.e. the fact that two globally different connectives can take the same value when the value of their arguments is restricted to a particular domain or when their arguments are logically related. For instance, if p is equivalent to q then p or q is equivalent to p and q. Similar examples can be given for many other pairs, and the "local equivalences" to which they give rise look less trivial when one considers functions taking their arguments in more complex Boolean algebras. Take, for instance, the binary function * corresponding to so-called symmetric difference) : A *B = (A -B) A (B -A). One can easily show that if A < B then A*B = B-A ("B and not-A") and when A nB = 0 then A * B = AV B ("A or B"). So in some contexts the symmetric difference corresponds to the exclusive disjunction and in others to and not. Whatever the complexity of arguments of Boolean functions, however, the existence of such local equivalences in no way indicates that Boolean functions are vague or ambiguous, and even less that they are evidence for non-compositionality.
As for the connective unless various difficulties concerning its analysis are well known. It is important to realize, however, that this variety of proposed analyses, even if many of the proposed solutions are truth-functionally equivalent, does not address the problem of compositionality but rather the question of whether there is a unique (binary) truth-functional connective corresponding to unless.
Formal preliminaries
The theoretical tools which will be used are those which are by now standard in formal semantics: these are the tools of generalized quantifiers theory enriched by Boolean semantics as developed by Keenan (Keenan 1983, Keenan and Faltz 1985) .
This means in particular that all logical types Dc, denotations of the category C, form atomic (and complete) Boolean algebras. The meet operation in any Boolean algebra will be noted, ambiguously, by and. The partial order in these denotational algebras is interpreted as a generalized entailment. Thus it is meaningful to say that an entailment holds between two NPs or between two nominal determiners, etc. Thus we can now (truthfully) say that the NP in (3a) entails the NP in (3b) and in (3c) and that the determiner in (4a) entails the determiner in (4b): To analyse such cases we will need two classes of conservative functions defined by a property: CONSP(P), positive conservative functions defined by property the P and CONSN(P), negative conservative functions defined by the property P. By
Finally, I will make use of restricting algebras, i.e. algebras of restricting functions. Such algebras constitute possible denotations of modifiers. A modifier is a functional expression of category C IC for various choices of C. Given the categorisation of modifiers they denote functions from Dc into Dc and the set of all such functions with operations defined pointwise constitutes an atomic (and complete) Boolean algebra. Now, it is an important empirical fact that not all logically possible functions of this type are denotations of modifiers found in natural language. As Keenan (1983) claims, and he considers this claim as a language universal, all extensional modifiers denote restrictive functions in the following sense: F is restricting (in the algebra Dc/ c) iff for all X E Dc, F(X) < X. I will consider in some detail some modifiers modifying determiners occuring in EXCL phrases.
3 Exclusion phrases and compositionality Keenan 1996) considers that they result from the application of a discontinous determiner to a common noun. Thus Every student except Leo is a result of the application of the (discontinous) determiner Every...except Leo to the common noun student. Such determiners denote a co-intersective function and consequently the noun phrase corresponding to the EXCL phrase denotes the value of this function at the property corresponding to students. Keenan shows that exclusion determiners (with the exclusion complement different from a common noun) denote in the algebra of intersective or co-intersective functions (Keenan 1993) . So Keenan's analysis of EXCL phrases is directly compositional.
Under the second approach, proposed in particular by Moltmann (1996) the EXCL phrases result, syntactically, from the application of some functional expressions, in fact modifiers, to quantified NPs. One gets an NP in the form of an EXCL phrase by applying the "complement expression" except NP considered as a modifier, to an NP of the form All CN or No CN. So in this case, according to Moltmann, we have a modification of NPs. Interestingly enough, in order to account for certain semantic properties of EXCL phrases Moltmann has to take into account the internal structure of the modified NPs, and in particular the denotation of the common noun which occurs in it. Notice that if we consider, following Moltmann, that it is the first argument, the quantified NP, which is modified by the exclusion complement, then the function denoted by this modifier is not restricting. This is because (10a) does not entail (10b) and (11a) does not entail (11b):
(10a) Every student except Leo (10b) Every student (11a) No student except Leo (11b) No student An analysis of the type proposed by Moltmann can be suspected of being non compositional with respect to one of basic components it distinguishes, namely with respect to the modifier constituted by the complement expression except NP. However, the meaning of this latter complex expression, the modifier in Moltmann's analysis, can also be compositionally determined.
Concerning the proposal made in von Fintel, Moltmann (1996) notices that he proposes in his description two conditions one of which is global and as such renderss his approach incompatible with compositionality. For indeed his global uniqueness condition requires that the entire sentence without the EXCL phrase already be evaluated in order to predict the semantic effect of the phrase in the sentence. This is a good place to come back to Higginbotham's "argument" against compositionality. It is possible to construct with EXCL phrases and sentences in which they occur an "argument against compositionality" quite similar to the one given by Higginbotham in connection with unless. The first "argument" , although rough and hardly plausible (but in the spirit of the one given by Higginbotham) could be based on the observation that (7a) entails (12a) whereas (7b) entails (12b):
(12a) Not every student was sleeping and Leo was not sleeping (12b) (It is not the case that no student was sleeping) and Leo was sleeping Since the second conjuncts in (12a) and (12b) are contradictory, one could claim that the meaning of except cannot be compositionally predicted because sentences in which it occurs gives rise in a systematic way, depending on some parts of the considered sentences, to contradictory entailments. I do not think that anybody would take this "argument" seriously and this is for two reasons: first (12a) and (12b) are not equivalent to (7a) and (7b), respectively, and second, the entailments in question are contradictory only by chance, so to speak, because the exclusion complement is a proper noun. It is possible, however to push further this line of thought and argue against compositionality on the basis of observation that for instance (9a) is equivalent to (13a) and (9b) is equivalent to (13b): (13a) Not no student is sleeping and the only students who are sleeping are Leo and Lea (13b) Not every student is sleeping and the only students who are not sleeping are Leo and Lea Notice that (8a) can be expressed by (14a) and (8b) In fact it is possible to give a compositional description of the connective except, and this is done in various papers concerning EXCL phrases already quoted. I will provide here two such descriptions based on Zuber (1998).
As the examples in (7) to (9) show the general form of EXCL phrases is the following: Q except E where Q is a quantified NP of the form Every CN or No CN. The expression E, the so-called complement of exclusion, is in many cases the remnant of an ellipsis and for this reason it can stand for many expressions. What is interesting, however, is that in all cases, either directly or "before elliptic ellision" these expressions all denote intersective or co-intersective functions determined by a property. In order to see this, notice first the following equivalences between the sentences in (a) and the corresponding sentences in (b): In examples in (b) the connective except connects two NPs. The second NP, the complement of exclusion is composed of two parts: a common noun, which is the same as the one occuring in the first NP, and a (discontinous) determiner. As we have already seen such determiners denote functions from CONSP(P). In (15a), and consequently in (15b) the determining property P is the property denoted by the common noun Albanians and in (16a) the determining property corresponds to the singleton containing as the only element Leo. In (17) the determining property is the union of individuals denoted by each member of the conjunction of proper nouns occurring in the complement of the exclusion phrase.
The situation is similar with EXCL phrases beginning with the universal quantifier every the connective except connects two NPs formed with determiners denoting negative conservative functions (determined by a property). This is because in this case a post-negation must be used as indicated in equivalences in (16) and more precisely in (17) The complex determiner with descriptions given in (21) has the form D except A, i. e. it has three syntactic parts: the connective except and its two arguments. We can now ask the question of whether the proposed description allows for compositional description of all parts when other groupings of basic elements are applied. Since in this case only binary branchings are possible let us consider the two most plausible ones.
Take first left-to-right binary branching, i.e. the following grouping: ((D except) A). It can be considered as an application of the modifier D except to the complement A. Semantically such a move gives us a nice formal interpretation, according to descriptions given in (21) (cf. Zuber 1997): the restricting function denoted by the modifier No. . . except (every... except) applies to the (positive or negative) conservative function determined by the property P (denoted by A) and gives as the result, when the complement A is a proiper noun (or a conjonction of proper nouns) the atom determined by the property P of the intersective (co-intersective) algebra.
We can now ask about the validity of the particular version of the principle, indicated in the introduction. For this let us consider the grouping of the form (D(except A) ), i.e. the one in which we have a "post-modifier" except A having as its argument the quantifier No or Every on the initial position. One could suspect that it is not possible to compute compositionally the meaning of such complex modifier because the complement A can be interpreted either by a positive conservative function (determined by the denotation of A) or by a negative conservative function. Which function it is exactly depends on the missing argument in initial position. If the missing argument is the determiner No then the complement, being a remnant of an ellipsis, is interpreted by a positive function, and if the missing argument is the determiner Every then the complement is interpreted by a negative function. Less formally the supposed non-compositionality of the modifier except A can be expressed in the following way. The connective except indicates that its second argument is exceptional, relative to a given set of objects. Now, an object can be exceptional in a given set of objects because either it has a property that other objects do not have or because it lacks the property that all other objects have. In the full EXCL phrase the first type of exception is induced by the initial determiner No and the second type by the initial determiner Every. So, one could claim, the meaning of the complex sub-part in which these determiners are missing cannot be compositionally determined. In fact a compositional interpretation of such a modifier is obtainable directly from surface forms, without making use of ellipses which are indicated in (15) -(19) . Indeed, in this case the connector except denotes the function EXCEPT which maps properties (denoted by the complement A) to a function EXCEPT(P) (where P is the denotation of A) which has as its domain the set of two quantifiers, No and Every (by which EXCL phrases can begin). The values of such function are quantifiers of type < 1,1 > corresponding to the exclusion determiners. These values are given as follows:
(24) EXCEPT(P)(No)(X)(Y), 1 iffPnX=XnY (25) EXCEPT(P)(Every)(X)(Y) = 1 if fPnX=X-Y
It is easy to check that these definitions give us the desired results.
Notice that in the above definitions we use essentially the syntactic information that EXCL phrases can begin only with NPs No or Every.
From except to unless
The analysis proposed for EXCL phrases can easily be extended to complex sentences with unless. Since the purpose of this paper is not a full description of unless I will give here only some indications of how it can be done.
It is useful to distinguish two cases of sentences with the connective unless. In the first case, which in fact is only relevant for the Higginbotham discussion, unless connects two sentences, the first of which contains a quantified noun phrase (formed from every or no) binding a pronoun occurring in the second sentence connected by unless. One observes that in such sentences the connective unless can be replaced by except in conjunction with if to give a logically equivalent sentence. Furthermore, the equivalent sentences thus obtained can be further reduced to equivalent sentences in which EXCL phrases occur. Examples of logically equivalent sentences obtained this way are given in (25) and in (26):
(25a) Every student will go to the party unless he is tired (25b) Every student will go to the party except if he is tired (25c) Every student except the tired ones will go to the party (26a) No person will eat steak unless he eats lobster (26b) No person will eat steak except if he eats lobster (26c) No person except lobster eating persons will eat steak Moreover, many sentences with except can be transformed into equivalent sentences with unless by replacing except by unless and by operating some changes in the structure of the remaining part. Thus (27) and (28) (29a) Every student will swim unless it is raining (29b) Every student will swim except if it is raining (30a) Leo will go to the party unless he is tired (30b) Leo will go to the party except if he is tired Now it is clear that given the above equivalent sentences of the first type can be directly analysed in the same way as the sentences in which EXCL phrases occur and which are analysed in the preceeding section. They have a syntactic structure compatible with the principle of compositionality.
Concerning sentences of the second type it is also possible to provide a compositional analysis for them. To do this we need to make use of the application of generalized quantifiers theory to the study of conditionals as proposed by van Benthem (1984) and studied in some more detail in Lapierre (1996) . Under this appproach IF is considered as a propositional determiner relating sets of situations (occasions, states of affairs, possible worlds, etc.) supposed to be denoted by sentences. These situations correspond to situations in which the two sentential arguments of IF are true. In this way IF induces a quantification over situations and the type of quantification induced may depend on the precise meaning of IF in question. The simplest case, the one illustrated by the examples above, is when IF corresponds to the universal quantifier. In this case EXCEPT IF creates "exclusion sentential phrases" analogous to those of EXCL phrases and which denote the set of sets of occasions. Such hidden quantifications over situations is better seen when the explicit translations using the notion of occasion of the sentences involved are given: (30a) and (30b) can be roughly translated as (31):
(31) In all situations except in situations in which Leo is tired, Leo will go to the party I will not spell out details of this proposal because it does not concern directly sentences relevant to Higginbotham and Pelletier's discussion. It seems obvious to me, however, that a relatively simple enrichment of the model, necessary anyway for a serious analysis of sentence denotations, will allow for a semantic treatment of sentences with unless of both types mentioned in a way compatible with the principle of compositionality.
Conclusions
Given the semantic and syntactic complexity of exclusion determiners and exclusion noun phrases I have discussed certain aspects of semantic compositionality in their context. I have been in particular interested in a stronger version of the principle of semantic compositionality, the version which takes into account the compositionality up to "second level", i.e. not only the compositionality of a given complex expression but also the compositionality of any complex immediate part of it. It appears that such a stronger version holds also for exclusion determiners of the form D except A, where D is either No or Every, even if the determiner is grouped as (D (except A) ). This shows that the function computing semantic value can have, contrary to Higginbotham's claim, some of its values contingent on the nature of its argument. Thus if the expression M(A) is interpreted by F (a), where F is the function interpreting the functional expression M, the fact that the values F can assign to an argument can vary with the nature of that argument does not bear on the question of whether M(A) is compositionally interpreted. I have also shown that the methods used to analyse EXCL phrases can be extended to sentences with the connective unless since unless is equivalent to except if and if can be considered as a sentential determiner which denotes a relation between sets of occasions in the same way as nominal determiners denote relations between sets of individuals. Consequently, and this is a side result, sentences with unless do not challenge compositional analysis, contrary to some claims made in the literature*) *) Many thanks to Ed Keenan for important comments on the previous version of this paper.
